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Quality in Judicial Opinions
ROBERT A. LEFLAR*
I have been reading judicial opinions since I entered law
school in 1924, have written a few myself, and have worked with
approximately one thousand (1000) appellate judges in seminars
which devoted time to discussion of the topic "Preparation of
Judicial Opinions." On the basis of that observation and experience, I have concluded that Judge James D. Hopkins has as
keen an appreciation of the problems inherent in the writing of
opinions as has anyone among that thousand of judges, and that
he himself has been one of our better writers of such opinions.
My own evaluations are less significant in leading to these
conclusions than is Judge Hopkins' own performance. It is upon
the latter, necessarily, that the conclusions are based. Accordingly, the important parts of this comment, sustaining those
conclusions, will be largely copied from Judge Hopkins' writings,
including his opinions. He unwittingly, more than I titularly, will
be the author of the essential parts of this short study.
Judge Hopkins was first a student member, then for many
years a faculty member, of the Appellate Judges Seminars,
which have been held at the New York University School of Law
since 1956. As a faculty member he served on the panels assigned to deal with a good many different topics, including Judicial Administration, the Appellate Judicial Process, Statutory
Interpretation, and Review of Decisions of Administrative Agencies. But the panel on which he regularly served as chairman was
the one which always evoked the greatest interest among the
seminar members. This was the panel in charge of the topic
"Preparation of Judicial Opinions." His proficiency both in anal* B.A., 1922, Univ. of Arkansas; LL.B., 1927; S.J.D., 1932, Harvard Law School; Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas; former Associate Justice, Arkansas
Supreme Court; Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University; Director and Consulting Director of Appellate Judges Seminars, Institute of Judicial Administration, since
1956. Author of APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS (West 1974); INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDUNES OF APPELLATE COURTS (American Bar Foundation 1976).
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ysis and in clear understandable presentation, as well as in his
own writings, were quickly recognized, and resulted in his being
rated as a top faculty member by his student judges. He continued to serve until the constantly increasing caseload on his court
compelled him to give up this interesting though unremunerative outside activity.
It has been said that appellate judges are, by the very nature of their work, professional writers. Yet few of them have
gained acclaim, even among members of the bar, for their performance of that part of the judicial task. There has been a considerable volume of writing about opinion writing, and most of it
has been critical.
Dean Wigmore's comments are among those most quoted.
Writing early in the century, in the first edition of his great treatise on the law of evidence, he listed six major shortcomings in
the bulk of the many thousands of opinions he had read.' Five of
the shortcomings had to do with content and form. First was the
failure to exhibit knowledge of and reliance upon broad legal
principles as distinguished from narrow rules. Others were disregard of controlling precedents, overemphasis on techniques and
technicalities, undue bondage to the servitude of precedent, and
overconsideration of every point of law raised in the briefs. The
sixth, probably not in point here though now a common basis for
criticism, was the one-man opinion. Mercifully, he did not dwell
upon the too-frequent clumsiness of legalistic style and even
grammar that more ordinary critics have often observed.
One rather obvious consideration that has bearing on how
an opinion should be written is: for whom is the opinion written,
for what readership?' Not all opinions are destined for posterity.
The first readership quite definitely consists of the writer's fellow judges. Their preferences and special concerns, or at least
those of a majority of them, have to be satisfied, else the opinion
must be revised as a dissent. Apart from that, it is evident that
some opinions will be of real interest primarily, or even only, to
the immediate parties and their counsel. Such opinions can be
1. 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 8a, at 243-53 (3d ed. 1940); id. at 243 n.1
(originally published in 1914, in Second Supplement to the First Edition).
2. Cf. Leflar, Some Observations ConcerningJudicial Opinions, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
810, 813 (1961).
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written simply, without much effort expended on achievement of
literary quality. A clear statement is enough. If the case is one
that has excited wide public interest, the opinion should be so
written that the interested public can understand it, even when
they read about it in the newspapers. That requires that it be so
written that newspaper reporters can understand it. The public
is the employer for whom the judge is working.
If the decision is one that will, or may, have precedential
significance, and especially if it involves genuine policy considerations, it is being written not only for the parties, fellow judges,
and the reading public, but for the bar, for law students, and for
future judges. It may even be written for members of the legislature; they sometimes attempt to straighten out mixed-up and
obsolete areas of the law-both wisely and unwisely. At any rate,
it is these most important opinions that commentators are concerned about, and it is to the writing of them that much critical
advice is principally directed.
Of prime importance is a common-sense requirement that
the real reasons for the decision be set forth in such opinions.
Often, neither formal logic nor interpretations of prior precedent
constitute real reasons either for moving the law in new directions or for refusing to move it. The real reasons are apt to be
socioeconomic or even political. They underlie all law and all legal rules, whether laid down in England in 1607 to meet the
needs of that time and place, in New England to fit conditions
there in post-Civil War days, or in New York in 1983 to fit
whatever are thought to be the demands of the current society.
Citation of 1607 or 1870 precedents, or even those of 1970, too
often does not adequately explain 1983 decisions. Along with his
formal analysis of precedents and restatement of applicable law,
the good opinion writer must both understand what the real
socioeconomic or political reasons actually are and be able to explain them clearly and honestly.
Clear and honest explanations call for more than good intentions on the writer's part, for more even than sound learning
and moral integrity. Those judicial qualities, we can hope, may
be assumed. Effective exposition also calls for good expository
writing.
Careful organization of the materials to be presented is the
first prerequisite to effective exposition. Standards for organiza-
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tion of judicial opinions are not materially different from those
for other writing of the same general character. No one standard
can be applied to all cases. But most opinions are sufficiently
similar in content and purpose that some generalization is possible. Judge Frederick G. Hamley, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington and later on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 1956 prepared
for the Appellate Judges Seminars an organizational outlines
that has come to be accepted by hundreds of judges for most
opinions. It divides an opinion into five major parts.
The first part is usually short. It states the nature of the
action and how it reached the appellate court. The next, also
short, sets out the question or questions to be decided. Then
comes a statement of the facts-not all the facts in the record,
but only essential facts. If there be more than one question in
the case, so that issues have to be discussed one at a time, incidental facts that are relevant to one issue only are not set out
until that issue is discussed. The fourth part is an analysis of the
issue or issues one at a time in an order based on their interrelationship. This is referred to as "the meat of the opinion."
The facts relevant to each issue must be tied into the discussion
of it, but facts already stated need not be repeated except as
emphasis is required. Some kind of a conclusion is called for on
each issue that is deemed worthy of discussion, though one possible conclusion may be that the issue should be laid aside as
irrelevant. Finally, there is the disposition of the case. If the
judgment below is simply affirmed, or reversed and dismissed,
that is all there is to say. For other dispositions, however, more
detailed directions such as the scope of a new trial, corrected
instructions, allocation of costs, and the like, are necessary and
should be fully anticipated. These five elements, in varying
lengths but in this order, are appropriate to the great majority of
all appellate judicial opinions.
Opinion writers have received a plenitude of advice to the
effect that they should use good English. Most judges do not
need the advice except when they are hurried or get careless.
Law clerks and fellow judges usually catch common errors before

3. Published in Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts, 29-37 (American Bar Ass'n 1961).
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they come out in print. Yet dangling participles, mixed metaphors, strange punctuations, misspelt words, and dozens of other
mistakes do get into the reports. It is interesting that so-called
"typographical errors" rarely appear in the reports of opinions
written by real masters of the language.
In the Appellate Judges Seminars, Judge Hopkins as faculty
chairman of the panel on Preparation of Judicial Opinions dealt
with all the matters mentioned in the preceding pages. In fact,
the preceding pages constitute little more than a partial list of
aspects of the topic that he discussed with the judges, members
of courts from all over the United States, who attended the seminars. It was fairly early in his years of service on the faculty
that he wrote up and handed out to the judges a list of 33 basic
ideas applicable to judicial opinions. We still use the list in the
seminars, and as "Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions," it has
been published elsewhere." It is reprinted here verbatim, this
time without Judge Hopkins' advance permission. It is reproduced partly because it is one of the best pieces of advice ever
given to judges about their opinion-writing task, and partly because it sets forth so well the high but realistically practical
standards that have guided him in the preparation of the many
opinions which he has written in his long and distinguished appellate career. After his "Notes" are quoted, a few of those opinions, selected almost at random from the many years of his judicial service, will be cited briefly to show how he applied the
standards set forth in the "Notes" and dwelt upon in his panel
presentations to other appellate judges.
Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions by James D. Hopkins
Then said they unto him, say now Shibboleth: and he
said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right.
Then they took him and slew him at the passage of Jordan.
The Book of Judges: 12:6
But true Expression, like th' unchanging Sun,
Clears and improves whate'er it shines upon,
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.
Pope, Essay on Criticism

4. Hopkins, Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIAL JUDGES J. 49 (1969), reprinted with permission of the American Bar Ass'n, copyright 1969.
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I.

1. Judges write opinions for an audience. The audience
varies as the case varies.
2. The opinion, as an expression of judgment, is an essay
in persuasion. The value of the opinion is measured by its ability
to induce the audience to accept the judgment.
3. The nature of the audience is defined by the case. When
the issue is essentially factual, the audience usually consists of
the parties and their attorneys. When the issue is essentially legal, the audience usually consists of the parties, their attorneys,
and the bench and bar. When the issue has public implications,
the audience includes the legislature, public officials, the news
media, and the community.
4. The focus of the opinion will be as narrow or broad as
the nature of the audience. The style responds to the focus of
the opinion-that is, the style is adapted to the audience.
II.
5. The style of an opinion has two aspects-the organization of the discussion, and the composition of the language.
6. The organization of the discussion means first, the approach of the author to the issue, and second, the method employed to make the discussion clear and concise.
7. The approach should always be measured, temperate,
and objective. Rhetoric is best suited for the advocate; an opinion expresses a decision above the individual passions in the
case.
8. The method of the discussion is not bound by any one
rule. An opinion considering several issues may be divided into
branches. Footnotes are useful when they inform the reader as
to relevant citations and material not crucial to the decision or
contain quotations at length of statutory provisions and pivotal
testimony. Footnotes breed irritation when their number and
proximity interrupt the flow of the discussion.
9. The operative facts should be stated in depth preceding
the discussion in the opinion concerning their effect and the operative law. This is not an absolute: sometimes disparate issues
arise from unrelated facts, and divisions of the discussion as to
both fact and law pertinent to each issue assist understanding.
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10. One cardinal rule: do not omit the facts which are
stressed by the unsuccessful party or a doctrine which may be at
war with the ultimate disposition. Otherwise the standing of the
case both as to persuasiveness and as a precedent is impaired.
III.
11. The language of an opinion implies grammatical construction, sentence and paragraph structure, and choice of
words.
12. The nature of the appeal and the relationship of the
parties should appear in the opening paragraph of the opinion.
13. Simple declaratory sentences are the easiest to read.
Modifying clauses, if not carefully composed, entangle the
thought and deflect understanding.
14. Strong words move to persuasion. They are not manysyllabled but induce the sense of action. E.g., say "shows" rather
than "provides evidence", or "distrusted" rather than "did not
have confidence in."
15. Too many adjectives and adverbs weaken the movement of the sense. Nouns and verbs usually are enough.
16. Use the active voice. A person acts, sometimes a thing
or a force acts. The passive voice indicates an anonymous actor,
a vague thing, and an unknown force.
17. An affirmative statement is preferable to a negative
one. The reader may doubt the scope of the negative.
18. A clich6 cannot always be avoided-it is shorthand to
evoke a response. But it should be restricted to the necessities. A
cluster robs the opinion of the sudden insight which imparts
persuasion.
19. Metaphors illuminate, yet may also be delusive. Be
sure that they truly fit the pattern illustrated, and are not so
remote in their bearing that the reader loses his way in
underbrush.
20. Emphasis does not require reiteration. Once a point is
expressed well, saying it a second time denotes a concealed
doubt of the author.
21. Dictating an opinion invites amendment and re-writing
to shorten and strengthen its structure. Time does not always
allow a handwritten draft, but it usually is more effective than a
dictated draft. Remember that even a handwritten draft shows
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flaws when it reaches the eye in plain type.
22. Humor has a dubious place in an opinion. It is not an
universal commodity and the decision of the rights of the parties
is a serious matter. Irony may be an effective tool of expression,
when sparingly used, but sarcasm directed toward the parties is
seldom in good taste.
23. All rules of organization and language have exceptions.
The objectives always in mind are clarity, conciseness and movement. If the rules must be violated to accommodate the objectives, violate the rules.
IV.
24. Do not quote at length from citations. One or two
sentences, suitably culled, promote the movement; more impedes it.
25. One or two citations to support a general rule are sufficient. If more are needed or comment is relevant, put them in a
footnote.
26. At some point in the opinion appears its fulcrum. That
is where the author ends his discussion of the operative facts
and law and begins his explanation of the decision. The value of
the opinion largely hinges on this section. Make sure that it expresses the intent of the decision fully and clearly.
27. The statement of the relief granted should be sharply
defined. Otherwise the preparation of the judgment (or order) to
be entered becomes difficult and subject to mistake.
28. Distinguish between opinions which end a case and
opinions which decide preliminary questions. The latter may entail instruction to the parties as to future procedure and therefore may be more discursive. Only in the rare case of a new statute or a question of public importance should an opinion ending
a case expand beyond the limits of the question presented for
decision, and then only to instruct as to future behavior which
appears inevitable.
29. Put the decision on a major ground. Recall that the
opinion loses worth as a precedent if the decision rests on alternative grounds. Sometimes this cannot be helped: the grounds
are equally significant and each is necessary to the proper disposition of the case. But generally the opinion should determine
the issue on only one major ground.
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30. Be sure that a precedent distinguished is truly distinguishable. The reasoning of the opinion is suspect if the distinction fails.
31. An opinion construing a statute gains little by reliance
on a rule of construction. For each rule favoring a certain construction another rule can be cited favoring a different construction. Give effect to what you believe to be the spirit and intent
of the statute, even though you legislate.
V.
32. Brevity is the soul of wisdom. Yet, do not be so brief as
to be cryptic. The audience may not always appreciate the author's desire to shorten the opinion to the irreducible minimum.
33. Everything said here has its exceptions. Be certain that
the exception is justified.
A good Hopkins opinion with which to start a quick look at
the merits of his judicial writing is Pagan v. Goldberger,5 handed
down seven years ago. On the frontier of growth in torts law, it
involved an action against a landlord for injury suffered by tenant's three-year-old child. The first sentence identified the parties, their relationship, and the nature of the injury. Four more
sentences set out the facts. A second paragraph in three short
sentences stated what was done in the lower court (complaint
dismissed on stated grounds), that "[wie reverse and grant a
new trial" (no pretense of suspense requiring one to read to the
end to learn the outcome), and the legal issue ("proximate cause
and foreseeability"). The opinion then proceeded to sum up the
New York background on that troubling area of law, briefly explained the relevance and irrelevance of four cases that had been
relied upon in argument, outlined under five headings the "helpful guidelines" that had emerged in New York, and then, in a
final paragraph, applied the guidelines to the facts and restated
the conclusion. A clearer, simpler or more scholarly treatment
would be difficult to imagine.
Another opinion, in Ellish v. Airport Parking Co.,' dealt
5. 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't 1976).
6. 42 A.D.2d 174, 345 N.Y.S.2d 650 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 882, 316
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with equally simple facts leading to a superficially opposite conclusion. A plaintiff's automobile left in the defendant's airport
parking lot was gone when she returned to reclaim it. Again, the
basic facts, the judgments in both the trial court and the appellate term, and the appellate division's affirmance of judgment
for the defendant, were set forth quickly, in less than sixteen
lines at the beginning of the opinion. A reader could have no
doubt as to what the case was about. The technical legal issue
was clearly stated: Was this a bailment from which bailee liability might ensue, or only a "license to occupy space" in the parking area? Next was a thorough six-part practical analysis of the
socioeconomic factors inherent in airport car-parking arrangements generally. This hinted at but did not explicitly state that
the real contest might be between automobile insurance carriers
(not just owners) and airport parking lot operators.7 A marginal
precedent was firmly distinguished. Social policy and technical
legal theory were carefully coordinated. The result was effectively explained.
A more complex problem was presented in Musco v. Conte.
The facts were that M's hand was badly injured due to the negligence of C while M was helping C to park his automobile. While
the injured hand was being operated on, the negligence of Ds
(hospital and anaesthetists) in administering anaesthesia caused
M's death, for which M's administratrix brought action for
wrongful death against C. The case did not come on for trial
until nearly seven years after M's death. C then, and not until
then, filed a third party complaint against Ds for indemnity to
cover that part of the plaintiff's claim attributable to Ds' negli-

N.E.2d 715, 359 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1974).
7. Should New York law allow open discussion of the ultimate concern with subrogation of insurers to owner's claims? See Kelly v. Yannotti, 4 N.Y.2d 603, 608, 152
N.E.2d 69, 72, 176 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (1958) (recognizing that insurance companies as
third party defendants may be prejudiced by jury's cognizance of plaintiff's insurance
coverage and therefore granting severance); Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479,
490-91, 95 N.E. 10, 14-15 (1911) (holding that it was reversible error for plaintiff to introduce evidence that defendant was covered by insurance).
8. 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964). This case is cited and followed
in many later decisions. See, e.g., Bay Ridge v. State, 44 N.Y.2d 49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404
N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); Melodee Lane Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218
N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966). Musco is a leading case not only on the principal
issue decided in it but on preliminary issues as well.
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gence. The trial court dismissed the third party complaint, primarily on statute of limitations and laches grounds. The appellate division reversed that order, and reinstated the complaint.
As in the other cases cited, Judge Hopkins' opinion first set
out the facts, the procedural status of the case, and the issue on
appeal, all stated tersely but clearly. He then summarized the
law on joint and successive tortfeasors, in concise language that
has been much quoted since. Finally, in one page that another
writer might have expanded to five, he explained that the statute of limitations begins to run, as does laches, only when a
cause of action comes into existence which, in the case of a claim
for indemnity against a successive tortfeasor, is when the claimant as a joint tortfeasor pays the tort claim. It "accrues not at
the time of the commission of the tort for which indemnity is
sought, but at the time of the payment. . . .- The statute had
not yet begun to run when the third party complaint was filed. A
short explanation, showing that fairness to all parties permits,
even requires, this rule of law, was added, thus establishing that
the result not only complied with formal law but with common
sense as well. A final paragraph defined exactly the status of the
case as it was placed again on the trial court docket.
Zarcone v. Perry0 was a difficult case involving a complex
and unique set of facts adroitly handled. The plaintiff brought a
common law cause of action against a New York State judge who
had badly mistreated him in the course of a dispute over the
quality of a cup of coffee the plaintiff had sold for the judge's
use. The complaint sought damages for false arrest, defamation,
intentional infliction of physical injury and mental distress, malicious interference with the plaintiff's business, and other related tortious wrongs. Judge Hopkins began his opinion by stating the problem, which was whether this action was barred by a
prior federal district court action" in which this plaintiff suing
this defendant had recovered a judgment, possibly not yet satisfied, for $140,000 for violation of his civil rights as protected by
42 United States Code § 1983. The mistreatment relied upon as
9. Musco v. Conte, 22 A.D.2d at 126, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
10. 78 A.D.2d 70, 434 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2d Dep't 1980), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 782, 431
N.E.2d 974, 447 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2248 (1982).
11. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).
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constituting the common law torts now complained of was essentially the same mistreatment proved in the earlier federal action
for deprivation by purported state authority of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of
the United States. The legal characters of the two causes of action, however, were quite different. The Hopkins' opinion in the
second and third paragraphs went straight to the heart of the
matter:
The questions thus presented are, first, whether the principles of res judicata resting on a judgment in a Federal court in an
action to recover damages for the deprivation of civil rights under
section 1983 apply to bar a State court action to recover damages
for common-law torts and, second, whether a recovery in the
State court action is banned because a double recovery for the
wrongs suffered would thereby be permitted.
We hold that the doctrine of res judicata bars the subsequent State court action and that a recovery in the State court
1
action would constitute a double recovery. 2
The opinion then set out (1) the full facts asserted and steps
taken in the state action, (2) the nature of civil rights claims
under section 1983, (3) the New York, Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, and federal authority on the scope of res judicata
doctrine, (4) the unwisdom of double recoveries, and (5) the relevance of newly developing rules of collateral estoppel to this
case. That ended the discussion. The result seemed inevitable.
The other three judges concurred. So, it seems, would just about
every other appellate judge in the nation.
One other opinion will be noted. It is one that has not been
much quoted, much less followed, because a decision in another
state (California) rendered it moot. The Hopkins' opinion,
handed down in 1971, was in Pahmer v. Hertz Corp.,13 a conflict
of laws case. A New York guest (wife) sued her New York host
(husband) for injuries suffered because of his negligent driving
of a rented automobile in California while they were temporarily
in that state. California had a host-guest statute that undertook
to bar recovery in such cases; New York had no host-guest stat12. Zarcone v. Perry, 78 A.D.2d at 71, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
13. 36 A.D.2d 252, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296
N.E.2d 243, 343 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1973).
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ute. The decision, based on thoughtful interest analysis in the
light of relevant choice-influencing considerations, was that New
York law governed. Affirmance on appeal,1 4 however, was on the
new but clearly correct ground that the California Supreme
Court had in the interim declared that state's host-guest statute
to be unconstitutional,' 5 so that California's law was actually the
same as New York's and there was no longer any conflict of laws
question in the case. About all that can be said now is that if
Pahmer had not become moot and if the New York Court of
Appeals had accepted the choice-of-law approach that Hopkins'
opinion so clearly and persuasively presented, the New York law
of conflict of laws would be much less uncertain and probably
less criticized than it is today.
On some state intermediate courts, the judges have a sense
of frustration. They do not get the really big and important
cases; these go directly to the top court. To compensate, because
they want to see their opinions in print and want to see them
cited, they overwrite. They treat minor issues as though they
were major ones, or pull in incidental problems for learned analysis even though these are not really necessary or even clearly
relevant to the decision. Judge Hopkins did not do that sort of
thing. He disdained it. Perhaps he as well as his appellate division colleagues were aided by the fact that their court always
had more cases, both important and less important, than just
about any other court in the nation, so that they had little time
to devote to superfluous matters. The fact remains that Judge
Hopkins' opinions attached importance only to real issues. Consequently, he attached importance to his opinions only when the
inherent significance of the issues deserved that evaluation.
The vagaries of public life, as they operate on any individual, are incalculable. At least they cannot be calculated until the
individual's public life nears its end. If James D. Hopkins had
been elevated to the New York Court of Appeals, as was once a
real possibility, where he might even have become Chief Judge,
or if he had been named to the United States Supreme Court, a
more remote yet not impossible possibility, he would have come,
14. Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 243, 343 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1973).
15. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 882, 506 P.2d 212, 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 407.
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like Cardozo, to be more widely publicized and his outstanding
abilities, known to us who have worked with him, would have
been nationally recognized. He would be hailed throughout
America today as one of the nation's great jurists. We who are
acquainted with his work and his career know that such a reputation would be genuinely justified. With us that is his
reputation.
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